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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-JURISDICTION OF STATE COURT OVER 
NONRESIDENT ToRTFEASOR-The defendant, a resident of Wisconsin, was 
engaged in the business of selling appliances and sent one of his employees 
to deliver a gas cooking stove to the plaintiff in Illinois. Claiming that the 
employee had negligently injured him in unloading the stove, the plain-
tiff brought action in Illinois, seeking damages of $7,500. A summons was 
personally served on the defendant in Wisconsin, and the defendant ap-
peared specially, moving to quash the summons on the ground that the 
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Illinois statute,1 providing for extraterritorial service on any person who 
commits a tortious act within the state, contravened the constitutions of 
the United States and Illinois. The lower court granted the motion quash-
ing the service of summons. On appeal, held, reversed. The statute is not 
unconstitutional in authorizing service outside the state for a single tortious 
act committed within the state. Nelson v. Miller,2 (Ill. 1957) 143 N.E. (2d) 
673. 
The traditional basis of state jurisdiction over the person was physical 
power and was considered a prerequisite to a valid judgment.3 In response, 
however, to a changing economic climate, the Supreme Court indulged in 
a number of fictional concepts concerning corporations, moving from the 
early view that a corporation could not be sued outside the state in which 
it was chartered4 to the later "consent"5 and "presence"6 theories which 
were devised to avoid the difficulties of the power theory of jurisdiction. 
In regard to jurisdiction over nonresident7 individuals, similar departures 
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. II0, §§16, 17. Sec. 17 (I) is as follows: "(I) Any person, whether 
or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of 
the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits said person, and, if an individual, his 
personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of 
action arising from the doing of any of said acts: (a) The transaction of any business 
within this State; (b) The commission of a .tortious act within this State; (c) The owner-
ship, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this State; (d) Contracting to insure 
any person, property, or risk located within this State at the time of contracting." 
2 The court was initially faced with defendant's contention that because the cause 
of action arose before the effective date of the statute it could not constitutionally apply 
to him. The court concluded, however, that retroactive application was possible since 
extension of jurisdiction under the statute did not rest upon the implied consent of the 
defendant. The court further stated that the application of the statute to the defendant 
was not a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since there 
was no creation of new liability for past acts, the statute relating only to procedure. 
Principal case at 675-676. Compare Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 Ill. 591, II4 N.E. (2d) 686 
(1953) with Gillioz v. Kincannon, 213 Ark. 1010 at 1018, 208 S.W. (2d) 997 (1948). See 
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., (U.S. 1957) 26 U.S. Law Week 4073 at 4074, holding 
that retroactive application of a similar statute does not impair the obligation of con-
tracts, as it did not affect substantive rights. 
3 Dodd, "Jurisdiction in Personal Actions," 23 Ill. L. Rev. 427 (1929). This view was 
reasserted by Justice Holmes when he stated that the "foundation of jurisdiction is 
physical power," McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 at 91 (1917). This concept had previous-
ly been elevated to a constitutional status under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). However, a recent discussion of the 
physical power doctrine suggests that it was not in fact derived from a common law 
background as previously expounded. Ehrenzweig, "The Transient Rule of Personal 
Jurisdiction: the 'Power' Myth and Forum Conveniens," 65 YALE L. J. 289 (1956). 
4See GoonRicH, CONFLICT oF LAws, 3d ed., 209 (1949). See also Bank of Augusta v. 
Earle, 13 Pet. (38 U.S.) 519 (1839). 
Ii Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. (59 U.S.) 404 (1855). See Conn. Mutual 
Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899). 
6 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914). See Bank of America 
v. Whitney Central Nat. Bank, 261 U.S. 171 (1923); Philadelphia &: Reading Ry. Co. v. 
McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917). 
7 As to resident defendants, the crumbling of the power theory is illustrated by a 
case in which domicile in the state was alone considered sufficient to bring an absent 
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from the power theory were signalled by cases involving nonresident motor-
ist statutes8 and nonresidents engaged in state-regulated securities trans-
actions.9 With this background of fictive analysis of state jurisdiction as 
illustrated by decisions involving both corporations and individuals, a 
more practical concept was developed in International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington.10 The Court explicitly discarded the "consent"11 and "presence" 
theories for a less mechanical and more flexible concept which stressed a 
test of reasonableness and fairness, balancing the inconvenience of a suit 
to the defendant against the necessity of protecting the residents of the 
state.12 The question left unanswered by International Shoe is whether 
a single act within the state is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction when it is 
neither dangerous nor one which the state has a particular interest in 
regulating.13 While dicta in that case suggests that it is not,14 the result 
in the principal case is to be preferred. The tort allegedly committed in 
Illinois would seem to be a sufficient "minimum contact" with that state 
to bring the "fairness" test of International Shoe into play.15 Moreover, 
while the Supreme Court decisions finding jurisdiction over nonresidents 
based on operation of automobiles,16 sale of securities,17 and sale of 
insurance18 can be explained as based on dangerous acts or ones which 
defendant within the reach of the state's jurisdiction. Milliken v. Meyer, Admx., 3ll U.S. 
457 (1940). 
8 Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). 
9 Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935). Compare Flexner v. 
Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919). 
10 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Although this case dealt with the activities of a foreign cor-
poration within the state, the language is sufficiently broad to indicate that it would 
also apply to the activities of individuals. Cleary and Seder, "Extended Jurisdictional 
Bases for the Illinois Courts," 50 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 599 at 603 (1955); note, 16 UNIV. 
CHI. L. REv. 523 at 534 (1949). 
11 See also Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co., 346 U.S. 338 at 341 (1953), soundly 
criticizing the "consent" theory where nonresident motorist statute and question of venue 
in the federal courts were involved. 
12This test of fairness may be no easier in its application than the "presence" theory, 
but at least it places the determination of jurisdiction on a more realistic basis. 
13 See, generally, note, "Single Act Statutes and Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corpora-
tions," 43 VA. L. REv. 1105 (1957). 
14 "Finally, although the commission of some single or occasional acts of the corporate 
agent in a state sufficient -to impose an obligation or liability on the corporation has not 
been thought to confer upon the state authority to enforce it . . . other such acts, 
because of their nature and quality and the circumstances of their commission, may be 
deemed sufficient to render the corporation liable to suit. . • ." (emphasis added). In-
ternational Shoe Co. v. Washington, note IO supra, at 318. 
15 See Cleary and Seder, "Extended Jurisdictional Bases for the Illinois Courts," 50 
N.W. Umv. L. REV. 599 at 607 (1955); Joiner, "Let's Have Michigan Torts Decided in 
Michigan Courts," 31 MICH. STATE B. J. 5 at IO Gan. 1952). 
16 Kane v. New Jersey, Hess v. Pawloski, note 8 supra. 
17 Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, note 9 supra. 
18 Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950). The Court's recent decision 
in McGee v. Intl. Life Ins. Co., note 2 supra, was not based on any special state interest 
in regulating insurance and probably represents the final extension of Pennoyer v. Neff. 
In the McGee case it was held that California could exert jurisdiction over a Texas in. 
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the state has a particular interest in regulating,19 other courts have found 
the commission of a tort20 or the making of a contract21 sufficient, and 
these cases cannot be explained on any such basis. They seem proper be-
cause the degree to which a nonresident's activity endangers the inhabitants 
of Illinois would not seem to be the controlling factor in determining the 
fairness of subjecting the nonresident to suit.22 The extent of contact the 
defendant had with the state, the benefit and protection he derived 
from the laws of the state, the relative extent of his inconvenience,23 
the location of the witnesses, and the law which will govern in determining 
liability, more than the degree of danger involved in the nonresident's 
activity, would seem to be some of the relevant factors in determining 
the fairness and reasonableness of extending jurisdiction to cover the de-
fendant.24 Moreover, just as the above factors should determine the due 
process question, they also bear on the convenience of the forum,25 and any 
case in which due process would be found would also be a case which would 
most conveniently be tried in Illinois. Since plaintiff's claim was apparently 
in good faith for a substantial sum, since defendant resided in an ad-
joining state,26 since part of his income was derived from sales in Illinois, 
since Illinois law would control, and since all witnesses except the employee 
would presumably be Illinois residents, both due process and convenience 
would seem to be satisfied by Illinois suit against this nonresident. 
surance company whose sole contact with California was to issue an insurance policy 
to one of its residents. 
19 Dubin v. Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. &: C. 61 (1938) (ownership of property) can also 
be explained on this basis. See also Peters v. Robin Air Lines, 281 App. Div. 903, 120 
N .Y.S. (2d) 1 (1953) (operation of aircraft). 
20 Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A. (2d) 664 (1951). See also 
Gillioz v. Kincannon, note 2 supra. But see Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 
(D.C. Md. 1950) 89 F. Supp. 654, where the court felt it was necessary to find more than 
a single isolated act unless the single act was subject to the police power. 
21 Compania de Astral, S. A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A. (2d) 357 (1954), 
cert. den. 348 U.S. 943 (1955). 
22 In Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Ladner, 210 Miss. 863 at 884, 50 S. (2d) 615 (1951), 
the court stated that "any distinction between jurisdiction founded upon doing business 
in a state which involves danger to life or property or state regulation, and on the other 
hand contractual obligations arising out of such business, is artificial and not consistent 
with the principle or policy of the statutes and foregoing decisions." Although this case 
did not involve a single isolated act within the state, it is significant in respect to the 
rejection of the view that a dangerous activity was necessary to support jurisdiction. 
23 Query: Suppose plaintiff's claim had been for $75 rather than $7,500 and defendant 
had resided in California rather than Wisconsin? 
24 Cf. factors considered in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., note 2 supra; Gulf 
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 at 510 (1947). 
25 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, note 24 supra, at 510. See also Joiner, "Let's Have 
Michigan Torts Decided in Michigan Courts,'' 31 MrCH. STATE B. J. 5 at 11-12 Gan. 
1952). 
26 Since defendant apparently never left Wisconsin, jurisdiction over him was based 
solely on the application of respondeat superior. It might be argued that this factor should 
at least go on the constitutional scales as one element of the "fairness" of subjecting him 
to Illinois jurisdiction. The court inferentially rejected the argument by not mentioning it. 
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It is clear, however, that this decision does not predicate jurisdiction on 
the fact of defendant's liability in tort, but rather interprets the statutory 
words, "commission of a tortious act," as basing jurisdiction on the acts 
or omissions of a defendant from which liability may or may not ultimate-
ly be found.27 Such an interpretation is necessary, for if a tort itself were 
the basis of jurisdiction, after being found liable in Illinois the defendant 
could relitigate the entire question of liability in a challenge of the Illinois 
court's jurisdiction when plaintiff brought suit on his judgment in Wis-
consin.28 By avoiding this construction and by applying the "fairness" test 
in upholding the constitutionality of the statute as applied to defendant, the 
court provided a formidable protection for the residents of Illinois against 
the possibility that they will be deprived of adequate redress when non-
resident defendants leave the state.29 
]. Martin Cornell 
27 Principal case at 681. See also Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., note 20 
supra, where the court appeared to construe the statutory words "commits a tort" as not 
basing jurisdiction on the ultimate fact of liability in tort. 
28 The Full Faith and Credit Clause permits a collateral attack on the jurisdictional 
basis of a sister state's judgment. Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. (85 U.S.) 457 (1873). 
29 See generally O'Connor and Goff, "Expanded Concepts of State Jurisdiction over 
Non-Residents: The Illinois Revised Practice Act," 31 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 223 (1956). 
